Quote from: multifarious on March 22, 2008, 05:43:27 PMQuote from: Cleo on March 16, 2008, 05:05:47 PMI believe DAT's PAT specific questions types are these onesangle discriminationblock countingpaper foldingform developmenttwo forms of object visualizationThe Keyholes present a challenge I would say: e.g., you are asked which hole the 'key' on the left will fit through. The object on the left can be rotated in any direction prior to entering the hole, but can not be rotated while going through. Also, the hole must be an exact fit for the key.What the hell is going on in this threadI was expecting to read the woes of naive people who jumped head first into law school without realizing what it entailed.... Instead I got some weirdass diagrams...entertaining nonetheless
Quote from: Cleo on March 16, 2008, 05:05:47 PMI believe DAT's PAT specific questions types are these onesangle discriminationblock countingpaper foldingform developmenttwo forms of object visualizationThe Keyholes present a challenge I would say: e.g., you are asked which hole the 'key' on the left will fit through. The object on the left can be rotated in any direction prior to entering the hole, but can not be rotated while going through. Also, the hole must be an exact fit for the key.
I believe DAT's PAT specific questions types are these onesangle discriminationblock countingpaper foldingform developmenttwo forms of object visualization
I do not know what the deal is with medical schools and residency programs in the US, but in many countries they do not allow you to complete residencies 5+ years after you have graduated.
[...] Instead of exploiting the slave, the master here tries to take care of the worker so that the worker can continue to work. This allows both master and slave to work for the master's master, work itself. But what is crucial about this is that the "taking care of" here or "feeding" of the slave is only feeding the slave such that the worker's work -- and not the worker himself -- can continue. The emphasis is upon work abstracted from the existence of the slave that provides the work. Thus the slave sinks below the conditions that he would be under if he were wrapped up in the feudal master/slave dialectic, because the master here is not concerned with his existence -- the master is "incompetent to assure the continued existence" of the slave, as Marx puts it. The slave cannot properly be a slave under capitalism. That is, it cannot be assured as to whether he will exist as a slave: his bare existence is threatened in the face of the abstract labor-power he temporarily embodies. [...] The serf, in the period of serfdom, raised himself to membership in the commune, just as the petty bourgeois, under the yoke of the feudal absolutism, managed to develop into a bourgeois. The modern laborer, on the contrary, instead of rising with the process of industry, sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class. He becomes a pauper, and pauperism develops more rapidly than population and wealth. And here it becomes evident that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an overriding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society.
Quote from: Birkena on December 05, 2008, 10:27:12 PMHegel's dialecticTwo young followers of Hegel, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, took Hegel's ideas and transformed them into a philosophical tool for analyzing history, nature, and making social change. They kept the idea of dialectics -- motion and change coming about through opposing forces -- but turned Hegel "upside down." They argued that thought is a manifestation of the natural world -- that our thoughts flow from our experiences and the material world. [...]
Quote from: Mina on January 18, 2009, 09:15:20 PM2. No one really agrees on his theory of fire, some co-opted it for their own use Go Mina Go!
2. No one really agrees on his theory of fire, some co-opted it for their own use
American culture is an extraverted thinking culture, but it also has a secondary preference for introverted sensing, types that are interested in commerce. The USA is a consumer society and Americans like commercials, advertising, promotions, sales, etc. The TV infomercials are filled with get-rich, start-your-own-business, and home business programs like how to flip properties, medical billing from home, multi-level marketing, etc. Some people say that English is the language of commerce; well, USA is a nation of commerce. Why do so many people want to come here? Sure it's that freedom thing, but wouldn't you agree, it's mostly for the money?
Quote from: Birkena on December 05, 2008, 10:27:12 PMQuote from: apropos on December 03, 2008, 06:42:07 PMTwo thousand years later, Professor Hegel found in Heraclitus' swirling vortex of the unity of opposites the kernel of a new 'world philosophy', the origins of 'speculative logic', and the historical notion of perpetual change. [...]At any rate, Hegel's battle between thesis and antithesis, searching for synthesis, led directly both to Marx's dialectical materialism and to the fascist idealogy of the purifying powers of conflict and war. [...] Hegel's dialecticWe will never be done, says Derrida, with the reading of Hegel. When we think we have gotten beyond Hegel in trumpeting our escape from the strictures of reason, teleology, metanarratives, idealism, we are most Hegelian. Yet we frequently find, even in the most theoretically naive works, claims to have "deconstructed" prevalent interpretations or notions of reason, identity, consciousness, nature and the natural, morality, history, and so forth. Such trends may lead us to believe that we are done with Hegel, but, as Barnett says and this volume demonstrates, not only does Hegel define "the modernity that our postmodern era seeks to escape," but there is a Hegel that we have yet to examine. Just what deconstruction is still remains obscure for many. Sometimes confused with critique, at other times reduced to the absurdity of being unconcerned with truth, deconstruction has entered the vocabulary as something of a ghost, to borrow a figure from Derrida frequently invoked in this collection: its presence is felt but its features remain obscure. One reason for this ghostly presence is our refusal, or inability, to confront Hegel, whom Derrida calls in "Of Grammatology" "the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing." Hegel, says Barnett, "taught philosophers to examine all fields of knowledge as quasi-autonomous language games... Yet Hegel emphasized the cultural and historical specificity of language games; he also devoted a good deal of his thought to dissecting the internal logic of various language games" These games, then, are not mere games. Hegel narrates the unfolding of spirit in world history and its culmination in the Absolute, but he also historicizes reason, charting its contradictions and limitations. He is both the philosopher of unitary reason and the thinker of difference. Ultimately, it is the role of the negative in speculative idealism, the otherness operating within reason, that makes Hegel's philosophy the limit that defines the modernity our postmodernity remains within. In its confrontation with speculative idealism and the Aufhebung (a term that designates the negation, conservation, and elevation of a previous stage in consciousness), deconstruction is "to disrupt the virtual self-realization of onto-theology in speculative idealism." This disruption is not critique, the investigation of the criteria for philosophy, for it is not a work of making distinctions and judgments (in a Kantian sense) but a questioning of these very categories. Deconstruction operates from within the text, responds to its irreducible alterity. If Hegel's text, the "Phenomenology of Spirit" in particular, can be characterized as the totalizing thought of absolute spirit, Derrida's "text" can be defined as structurally infinite, a network without boundaries or closure. Derrida's "text" opens the self-identity implied in the traditional notion of the text by locating an unsublatable remainder that makes totalization impossible. The text, therefore, is governed by the traits of referral that make representation, self-reflection, and reference possible (impossibilities). This remainder reveals that the text, in this special sense, is already inhabited by its non-phenomenal other, its ghost, which both situates deconstruction within and against Hegelian speculative philosophy. When Derrida called Hegel "the last philosopher of the book and the first thinker of writing," he indicated that Hegel was both the culmination of Western metaphysics and the beginning of its deconstruction. Barnett says as much when he writes, "Hegel's text, in its performance of the thinking of difference, comprises the enabling condition of the strategies of deconstruction." If we are to overcome Hegel (and modernity), then we must inhabit him -- which we do, whether we know it or not. And to overcome him is to repeat him, with a difference. This contradictory structure is to be found already in Hegel: insofar as the truth of consciousness is self-consciousness, consciousness is already self-consciousness. Absolute self-relation is attained only when consciousness has returned from its other back to itself as self-consciousness. But this pathway is never smooth; it is marked by disruption, relativism, and plurality. Christianity, for instance, is the absolute religion but must be superseded by philosophy, Absolute Knowing; yet, the Aufhebung of religion into philosophy is disrupted by what makes it possible, the holy family. In short, we are confronted with two ways of reading Hegel, which will amount to two ways of reading Derrida. Either Hegel's text needs to be deconstructed or it is already deconstruction; either Derrida's reading of Hegel is an intervention that disrupts the system or it reveals a Hegel who is a thinker of difference as well as the philosopher of Absolute Knowledge. Our either/or is more properly a both/and: what unites these essays is a strategy of reading that asks, what remains in Hegel's text after the holocaust of Absolute Knowledge/after the text is deconstructed? What remains is the necessity of reading Hegel for these remains, that is, for what does not allow itself to be superseded or appropriated in the name of Absolute Knowledge. The Absolute is fissured, divided or fractured, like the columns in Derrida's most sustained reading of Hegel, Glas.In asking why Hegel figures so prominently in Glas when Derrida's analysis of the family and phallocentrism points to psychoanalysis, Suzanne Gearhart proposes that the Aufhebung is equivalent to Freud's concept of repression, which cannot be understood in terms of what is repressed "but only in terms of repression itself" as an ongoing process that serves the system of idealization; it does not merely forget or suppress but "also creates signification and value." The Aufhebung is the equivalent of repression insofar as it constitutes rational self-consciousness but is itself prerational, as is revealed in Derrida's analysis of the Hegelian family. Gearhart advises us to address the question of sexuality or gender from the concept of repression or else we lapse into a pre-Freudian logic of fetishism.
Quote from: apropos on December 03, 2008, 06:42:07 PMTwo thousand years later, Professor Hegel found in Heraclitus' swirling vortex of the unity of opposites the kernel of a new 'world philosophy', the origins of 'speculative logic', and the historical notion of perpetual change. [...]At any rate, Hegel's battle between thesis and antithesis, searching for synthesis, led directly both to Marx's dialectical materialism and to the fascist idealogy of the purifying powers of conflict and war. [...] Hegel's dialectic
Two thousand years later, Professor Hegel found in Heraclitus' swirling vortex of the unity of opposites the kernel of a new 'world philosophy', the origins of 'speculative logic', and the historical notion of perpetual change. [...]At any rate, Hegel's battle between thesis and antithesis, searching for synthesis, led directly both to Marx's dialectical materialism and to the fascist idealogy of the purifying powers of conflict and war. [...]
Can "consumer society" accurately describe the American polity? Does it not exist in actuality a priority of producer over consumer interests? It is obvious to anyone with eyes to see and bodies to be comforted. Contemplate the design of most airplanes and airports and explain how high consumer/user interests rank in the society's priorities. Enter an airport and sit, sometimes for hours, with 1,000 other consumers of airline services in a stifling waiting room with a 12-foot ceiling; or wedge yourself into a 15-by-18-inch seat, where your neighbor's backrest protrudes within a foot of your chest; or stand anxiously by one of the 4-5 toilets provided onboard to serve 400 passengers and try to imagine how lucky you are to live in "a consumer society." Nor do the rules seem consumer-friendly that allow overbooked airlines to bump passengers waiting to board; or to deny a passenger the right to switch to another airline without further charges when various troubles on the booked airline lead to many hours of delay, and sometimes cause cancellation too late for a passenger to find a reasonable alternative mode of travel — to say nothing of the costs of missing a connecting flight. How consumer friendly are those gas stations (once called service stations) that require consumers to pump their own gas or else pay an outsize premium per gallon? And can there be more frustrating moments in a working day than fighting with an electronic "pay station" in parking garages and lots that employ no attendants at all ("cost savings") and where the often balky machine must produce an entry ticket; and then later process the parking slip to permit exiting? How are consumer interests served when personal telephone records are legally available for a price and for sale at a profit? (Locatecell.com is only one corporation that legally mines and then sells such information to any business or government agency that cares to pay for it.) Consumers of cell-phone services come last when producers see profit opportunities. How well are consumer interests served when the law allows pushers of products to intrude at will upon our telephones, Internet, and fax machines? Or to pop ads onto television screens, more or less continuously, during an ongoing drama, sitcom, or sports program; or onto a computer screen, sometimes freezing a word-processing session? Even national public radio and television stations, partly supported by consumer subscriptions, now present several minutes of ads each hour, necessitated by cuts in congressional support. More than 80 years ago, that old radical Herbert Hoover, then secretary of commerce when radio was new, declared, "It is unconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility for service to be drowned in advertising." How quaint!Consumers are themselves to blame, seeing themselves first as producers rather than consumers. If there are many who would complain, the media — which are dependent on producers' ads — are not likely to give them much time or space. But who's complaining?
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