My whole point is that Law like any other profession is very difficult to get exactly what you want. Many law students even on JDunderground and such sites say they got a job doing Doc-Review or something sh***y, but many student doctors etc don't do anything glamorous for quite awhile at least in my very very very limited understanding of it. I just think people don't have patience and our willing to pay their dues anymore.
My point was Lawyer think doctors have it easy and the med students I have talked to think Lawyers have it easy.
To sum it up Medical School is harder to get into and takes way longer to finish than law school. However, once you get through on average the Doctor will do better than the lawyer. Law school is easier to get into and easier to finish. However, you have less restrictions and have an unlimited ceiling for earnings potential if you are really good. So it is a high risk/high reward profession.
Nietzsche says that "All psychology so far has remained hung up on moral prejudices and fears. It has not dared to go into the depths." Nietzsche changed it, and then Freud came along. The striking similarities between Nietzsche and Freud are well-known, and a whole literature is devoted to exploring them, primarily from a Freudian standpoint. While philosophers tend to be interested either in Nietzsche or in Freud, but rarely systematically in both, looking at Freud is useful for the purposes of this study, for two reasons. First, these similarities register strongly on a naturalist reading, and typically, in cases of such similarities, Freud provides laborious scientific investigations where Nietzsche offers flashy insights that require precisely such elaboration to be taken fully seriously. Second, while Freud never systematically engages with ER, nor even displayed a good understanding of its importance for Nietzsche, there are various grounds on which Freud would have rejected ER had he ever dealt with it. These two points show that exploring why Freud would have rejected ER is a fruitful way of exploring what to make of ER in the context of a naturalist reading of Nietzsche, and in general come to a better understanding of what Nietzsche took to be his greatest insight.While Nietzsche believes we are not entirely transparent to ourselves, it is Freud who delivers a systematic model of the mind that also assigns a proper place to the unconscious, a model that, without difficulties, can be understood as accommodating Nietzsche's views, to the extent that they are developed. The goal of Freudian psychoanalysis is to help patients come to terms with what lies buried in their unconscious if it leads to apparently inexplicable patterns of behavior that interfere with the patient's life. But the underlying model of the mind that guides therapy also teaches that it will be rather hard to know oneself sufficiently well to be confident that one really wants to live this life again and again and again. But if so, it becomes dubious that we should test our own ability to affirm our lives by asking whether we would repeat this same life eternally. What precisely, other than sheer euphoria, would such a test assess? The other reason, finally, why Freud would not endorse ER turns on his view of guilt. As opposed to Nietzsche, Freud does not think that guilt can ever be overcome. Guilt is the price human beings pay for civilization: it simply comes with people's not living by themselves. Thus there will always be at least this element in an individual's life that she would want to be without, and so, again, it will be rather hard to be in a position to endorse ER. It turns out that, upon closer inspection, Nietzsche is, or at any rate ought to be, closer to Freud on these matters than it first appears, and therefore this Freudian reason for resisting ER as a life-affirmation test also applies to Nietzsche.Like Nietzsche, Freud seeks to explain the origins of moral beliefs and emotions. Unlike Nietzsche, Freud does not think of such an account as part of a project of debunking morality. Neither is Freud concerned to object to common morality on behalf of human excellence, as Nietzsche is, nor does he have any interest in replacing debunked ideals with new ones, such as ER. In the "Future of an Illusion," Freud is clear that our God, Logos, promises no compensation for us who suffer grievously from life. Freud's vision, instead, is that morality can be justified on self interested grounds. Yet such self-interested morality merely delivers rules for conduct that are necessary for human beings to live together, but, as far as Freud is concerned, does nothing to answer any questions about the meaning of life. Freud is confident that in the long run nothing can withstand reason and experience, and the contradiction which religion offers to both is all too palpable – but, indeed, as he also reiterates in "Civilization and Its Discontents," no questions about meaning get answered anywhere: QuoteThe question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one. (...) It looks (...) as though one had a right to dismiss the question, for it seems to derive from the human presumptuousness, many other manifestations of which are already familiar to us. Nobody talks about the purpose of the life of animals (…) One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system.Freud is not only hostile to the idea of accepting questions such as the one about the meaning of life into the confines of the scientific worldview (which by itself would not be such a radical view); he also appears to be loath to accepting any areas of inquiry that are genuine and objective in a sense to be spelled out, but also discontinuous with science, again in a manner to be spelled out. As far as morality is concerned, what is thereby excluded are, for example, practical reasoning approaches and constructivist approaches. Freud, in fact, makes no effort (and has no way) to distinguish between religious worldviews and such approaches to morality. All of these forms of discourse would simply be "meaningless." Freud, that is, is a subscriber to a strongly positivist criterion of meaningfulness. Nietzsche and Freud are both naturalistic thinkers, and in particular they share an interest in explaining out moral beliefs and emotions in a manner continuous with the biological sciences. But Freud is a scientist committed to positivist worldview within which a lot of questions about how we ought to live simply make no sense. Nietzsche, as opposed to that, pursues his naturalist project as part of a larger project of debunking morality and replacing it with something else, namely ER. For Freud this would make no sense, but, following Nietzsche, this is so only because Freud mischaracterizes the significance of science to such an extent that he is in fact committed to an ascetic ideal. At any rate, this reason for why Freud does not endorse ER is not one Nietzsche has any particular reason to share.
The question of the purpose of human life has been raised countless times; it has never yet received a satisfactory answer and perhaps does not admit of one. (...) It looks (...) as though one had a right to dismiss the question, for it seems to derive from the human presumptuousness, many other manifestations of which are already familiar to us. Nobody talks about the purpose of the life of animals (…) One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a purpose stands and falls with the religious system.
In rebelling against determinism many thinkers have followed the 19-century philologist and philosopher Nietzsche. Nietzsche attempted to rescue humanity from scientific reductionism by positing radical individual freedom. He believed that all knowledge and truth are created by humans, not imposed on us by some external reality. We cannot blame the environment, nor biology, nor God for our character and behavior. Nietzsche rejected the idea that humans have fixed natures or essences. Rather, the choices we make as individuals shape our destiny. Many subsequent existentialists and post-modern thinkers have exulted in Nietzsche's liberation from reductionism and determinism.While Nietzsche's emphasis on free will might seem to rescue humanity from the degrading philosophies of environmental or biological determinism, it does nothing of the sort. It only elevates a small elite of humanity, whom Nietzsche called the Superman, or more literally, Overman. Nietzsche's freedom was freedom only for these Supermen, the creative geniuses (like himself) who would rise above the hoi polloi. He had nothing but disdain for the masses, whom he thought incapable of exercising true freedom. What Nietzsche contemptuously called the herd instinct of the masses fitted them for nothing other than submission to the domination of the Superman.Despite its stress on freedom, then, Nietzsche's philosophy is really a philosophy that aims at enslavement. Power ultimately decides not only who rules politically, but also what counts as truth. Nietzsche rejected any form of fixed truth or morality, thus undermining the very notion of humanity and human rights. Nietzsche despised weakness, compassion, and humanitarianism, preferring strength and domination. He was especially vehement in his rejection of Christian ethics, because it catered to the weak and downtrodden. His aristocratic morality aimed at justifying and benefiting the strong and powerful.In the twentieth century many existentialist philosophers, such as Heidegger and Sartre, embraced the general contours of Nietzsche's philosophy, denying that humans have any fixed essence and stressing radical free will in human decisions. Later in the twentieth century, however, many postmodern thinkers, though heavily influenced by Nietzsche, have reduced the element of individual agency still important to Nietzsche. Many literary scholars emphasized the written text over the author, who disappeared from consideration. Human intent became irrelevant in interpreting human documents. Dehumanization thus spiraled even further downward, as all human values were construed as socially constructed.
Nietzsche is often classified and taught along with existentialists, mainly because he is (like Kierkegaard) so adamantly an "individual" and an early advocate of "self-making." But Nietzsche also subscribes to a number of harsh doctrines that might be described as "fatalism" and a kind of "biological determinism," to name but two. Fatalism, strictly understood, means that nothing could be other than it is, and Nietzsche's sharp sarcastic comments about "the improvers of mankind" make it quite clear that he does not think that people can change their (collective) nature. Moreover, his persistent emphasis on "instincts," "drives," and "physiology" suggests a form of determinism based on our biology. Each of us individually has a particular "nature" that (whether actualized or not) cannot be altered. Like such existentialists as Kierkegaard and Sartre, Nietzsche is a powerful defender of what one might call "the existential self," the individual who "makes himself" by exploring and disciplining his particular talents and distinguishes himself from "the herd" and the conformist influences of other people. But Nietzsche also attacks the very concept of freedom and with it the existentialist idea that we are free and responsible to make of ourselves what we will. Furthermore, Nietzsche celebrates precisely those ancient concepts of "fate" and "destiny" that Sartre, in particular, rejects as exemplary of "bad faith."
I would be more careful to approach the whole "Nietzsche and Free Will" issue - here it is an interesting primer on it posted quite a while ago by a forum user: Quote from: abut on August 18, 2007, 04:55:07 PMNietzsche is often classified and taught along with existentialists, mainly because he is (like Kierkegaard) so adamantly an "individual" and an early advocate of "self-making." But Nietzsche also subscribes to a number of harsh doctrines that might be described as "fatalism" and a kind of "biological determinism," to name but two. Fatalism, strictly understood, means that nothing could be other than it is, and Nietzsche's sharp sarcastic comments about "the improvers of mankind" make it quite clear that he does not think that people can change their (collective) nature. Moreover, his persistent emphasis on "instincts," "drives," and "physiology" suggests a form of determinism based on our biology. Each of us individually has a particular "nature" that (whether actualized or not) cannot be altered. Like such existentialists as Kierkegaard and Sartre, Nietzsche is a powerful defender of what one might call "the existential self," the individual who "makes himself" by exploring and disciplining his particular talents and distinguishes himself from "the herd" and the conformist influences of other people. But Nietzsche also attacks the very concept of freedom and with it the existentialist idea that we are free and responsible to make of ourselves what we will. Furthermore, Nietzsche celebrates precisely those ancient concepts of "fate" and "destiny" that Sartre, in particular, rejects as exemplary of "bad faith."
"Suppose someone were thus to see through the boorish simplicity of this celebrated concept of 'free will' and put it out of his head altogether, I beg of him to carry his 'enlightenment' a step further and also put out of his head the contrary of this monstrous conception of 'free will': I mean 'unfree will' which amounts to a misuse of cause and effect." "Beyond Good and Evil"
Today we no longer have any pity for the concept of "free will": we know only too well what it really is — the foulest of all theologians' artifices, aimed at making mankind "responsible" in their sense, that is, dependent upon them. Here I simply supply the psychology of all "making responsible." ("Twilight of the Idols")
One should not wrongly reify "cause" and "effect," as the natural scientists do (and whoever, like them, now "naturalizes" in his thinking), according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the cause press and push until it "effects" its end. ("Beyond Good and Evil")
the sovereign individual, equal only to himself, all moral custom left far behind. This autonomous, more than moral individual (the terms autonomous and moral are mutually exclusive) has developed his own, independent, long-range will, which dares to make promises; he has a proud and vigorous consciousness of what he has achieved, a sense of power and freedom, of absolute accomplishment. This fully emancipated man, master of his will, who dares make promises ... "Genealogy of Morals"
I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an instinct of life — some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain canon of `shall' and 'shall not', some hindrance and hostile element on life's road is thereby removed. Anti-natural morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary precisely against the instincts of life — it is a now secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of these instincts. By saying 'God sees into the heart' it denies the deepest and the highest desires of life and takes God for the enemy of life.... The saint in whom God takes pleasure is the ideal castrate .... Life is at an end where the 'kingdom of God' begins ... "Twilight of the Idols"
The aptness of our interpretation is demonstrated unequivocally ... After ... "To stamp Becoming with the character of Being — that is the supreme will to power" — we soon read the following sentence: "That everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of Becoming to one of Being: peak of the meditation." It would scarcely be possible to say in a more lucid fashion, first, how and on what basis the stamping of Being on Becoming is meant to be understood, and second, that the thought of eternal return of the same, even and precisely during the period when the thought of will to power appears to attain preeminence, remains the thought which Nietzsche's philosophy thinks without cease. "Nietzsche," by Martin Heidegger, "The Eternal Recurrence of the Same"
In the aftermath of World War I, which some optimists were calling the war to end all wars, the philosopher George Santayana demurred, "Only the dead have seen the end of war." This sort of fatalism is still widespread today, and it cuts across political affiliations. Whether they are hawks or doves, on the left or on the right, many people have come to accept war as inevitable, even "in our genes." The obvious problem with such fatalism is that it can become self-fulfilling. Our first step toward ending war must be to believe that we can do it. We also need to come to grips with the scale of the problem. As far back as anthropologists have peered into human history and pre-history, they have found evidence of group bloodshed. In "War Before Civilization" Lawrence Keeley estimates that as many as 95% of primitive societies engaged in at least occasional warfare, and many fought constantly. Tribal combat usually involved skirmishes and ambushes rather than pitched battles. But over time the chronic fighting could produce mortality rates as high as 50%.This violence, some scholars argue, is an inevitable consequence of innate male ambition and agression. "Males have evolved to possess strong appetites for power," the anthropologist Richard Wrangham contends in "Demonic Males," "because with extraodrinary power comes extraordinary reproductive success." As evidence for this hypothesis, Wrangham cites studies of societies such as the Yanomamo, an Amazonian tribe. Yanomamo men from different villages often engage in lethal raids and counter-raids. Like most tribal societies, the anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon, who has observed the Yanomamo for decades, found that killers on average have twice as many wives and three times as many children as non-killers.But Chagnon, significantly, has rejected the notion that Yanomamo warriors are compelled to fight by their aggressive instincts. Truly compulsive, out-of-control killers, Chagnon explains, quickly get killed themselves rather than living long enough to have many wives and children. Successful warriors are usually quite contolled and calculating; they fight because that is how a male advances in their society. Moreover, many Yanomamo men have confessed to Chagnon that they loathe war and wish it could be abolished from their culture -- and in fact rates of violence have recently dropped dramatically as Yanomamo villages have accepted the laws and mores of the outside world. In his classic book "On Agression," the biologist Konrad Lorenz acknowledged that it might be possible to "breed out the aggressive drive by eugenic planning." But that would be a huge mistake, Lorenz argued, because aggression is a vital part of our humanity. It plays a role in almost all human endeavors, including science, the arts, business, politics, and sports. Aggression can serve the cause of peace. There are, for example, some extremely aggressive peace activists. Even if warfare is at least in part biologically based -- and what human behavior isn't? -- we cannot end it by altering our biology. Modern war is primarily a social and political phenomenon, and we need social and political solutions to end it. Many such solutions have been proposed, but all are problematic. One perennial plan is for all nations to yield power to a global institution that can enforce peace. This was the vision that inspired the League of Nations and the UN. But neither the US nor any other major power is likely to entrust its national security to an international entity any time soon. And even if we did, how would we ensure that a global military force does not become repressive?One encouraging finding to emerge from political science is that democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other. But does that mean democracies such as the US should use military means to force countries with no democratic tradition to accept this form of governance? If history teaches us something, it is that war often begets more war. Religion has been prescribed as a solution to war and aggression. After all, most religions preach love and forgiveness, and they prohibit killing, at least in principle. But in practice, of course, religion has often inspired rather than inhibited bloodshed. We will abolish war someday. The only questions are how, and how soon.
Lawyers have a 1.5% unemployment rate nation wide. Rest of america closer to double digits.Nuff said.
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