Law School Discussion

Legal Reasoning

Re: Legal Reasoning
« Reply #340 on: August 13, 2008, 06:08:57 PM »

I guess so, copula - sometimes the site does not allow you to log in no matter what! You've to set up another account risking being called an 'imposter' since any one can use the previous poster's username and avatar in order to somehow give the impression s/he is indeed the real thing.




Great username, Mona Lisa! The smile on the face of the Mona Lisa is so enigmatic that it disappears when it is looked at directly, says a US scientist. Professor Margaret Livingstone of Harvard University said the smile only became apparent when the viewer looked at other parts of the painting. The smile disappeared when it was looked at because of the way the human eye processes visual information. The eye uses two types of vision, foveal and peripheral. Foveal, or direct vision, is excellent at picking up detail but is less suited to picking up shadows. The elusive quality of the Mona Lisa's smile can be explained by the fact that her smile is almost entirely in low spatial frequencies, and so is seen best by your peripheral vision. The more a person stares fixedly ahead, the less useful is their peripheral vision. The best example of this effect was if someone was to stare at a letter on a page of print. Concentrating on one letter made it difficult to pick out other letters even a short distance away. The smile only became apparent if a viewer looked at her eyes or elsewhere on her face.


I guess we'd need the services of analysts to reduce the ambiguity of this highly ambiguous situation - with the ambiguity, I'd assume, deliberately created by Leonardo.

Not That Sarcastic, After All...
« Reply #341 on: August 14, 2008, 11:27:57 AM »

The idea that the universe has a rational structure that the mind can apprehend characterizes an older trend in European philosophy called "rationalism." Rationalism traces its roots to Rene Descartes and to the birth of modern philosophy. Most of 20th century European philosophy was a direct reaction to this older tradition, a reactionary attempt to explore the possibility that the universe has no rational structure for the mind to apprehend. Phenomenology, for example, as advocated by Edmund Husserl confines itself to observing and describing our own consciousness without drawing any conclusions regarding causes or connections.


Like cud is regurgitated grass for cows, logic is regurgitated opinion for humans. Whenever and wherever cows belch or dispose, they enrich air and fertilize earth. Whenever and wherever logic burps or disposes, it can and does distroy life. If the situation were reversed, cows would have long-been eradicated for posterity's sake... but logic is not eradicated though posterity be at stake. Instead of looking to visionaries and dreamers, whose eyes see above and beyond known, authority persists in thumbing well-worn logic-pages and recycling ineffective solutions.


Bob's Balding Spot

Bob was looking forlornly into the bathroom mirror while holding a pocket mirror up to the back of his head.

'There goes another hair,' he said sadly.

'Stop worrying' replied Sarah. 'You can't turn from being not bald to being bald with the loss of a single hair, can you?'

'I guess not' said Bob.

'So you're still not bald, are you?' said Sarah.

'I suppose not. But hang on! If what you say is true, then, no matter how many hairs fall out of my head, I will never be bald!'

'Er. I didn't say that.'

'But it does follow from what you said, doesn't it? Suppose there are exactly a million hairs on my head now, and I am not bald. If one hair is removed, and you're right that removing a single hair can't transform a non-bald person into a bald one, then I still won't be bald. And so on, until there are no hairs left. I still won't be bald! So it follows that your principle that, by removing a single hair from his head, you can't turn a person from being not bald into being bald, must be false!'

'You're mad.'

'But it follows! In fact, there must come a point where, by losing just a single hair, I'll turn from being bald into being not bald!'

'But that's absurd. There's not a precise number of hairs that marks the boundary between being bald and being not bald.'

'But there must be!'

'But then what is that number of hairs?'

'I don't know. Maybe it's 10,027. Maybe it's 799. But there must be such a number.'

'That's just plain silly.'

'Actually, it must be true! In fact, perhaps the hair that just fell out was the one that turned me from being not bald into being bald!'

Re: Not That Sarcastic, After All...
« Reply #342 on: August 15, 2008, 12:33:31 AM »

The idea that the universe has a rational structure that the mind can apprehend characterizes an older trend in European philosophy called "rationalism." Rationalism traces its roots to Rene Descartes and to the birth of modern philosophy. Most of 20th century European philosophy was a direct reaction to this older tradition, a reactionary attempt to explore the possibility that the universe has no rational structure for the mind to apprehend. Phenomenology, for example, as advocated by Edmund Husserl confines itself to observing and describing our own consciousness without drawing any conclusions regarding causes or connections.


Like cud is regurgitated grass for cows, logic is regurgitated opinion for humans. Whenever and wherever cows belch or dispose, they enrich air and fertilize earth. Whenever and wherever logic burps or disposes, it can and does distroy life. If the situation were reversed, cows would have long-been eradicated for posterity's sake... but logic is not eradicated though posterity be at stake. Instead of looking to visionaries and dreamers, whose eyes see above and beyond known, authority persists in thumbing well-worn logic-pages and recycling ineffective solutions.


The history of civilization is largely the account of the attempts of man to forget his transformation from an animal into a human being. So stubborn a refusal to forget is not an accident. Even the most enlightened of us will set up a Christmas tree for his children without having the least idea what this custom means, invariably disposed to nip any attempt at interpretation in the bud. For the thoughtful observer, however, both Christmas tree and trickster afford reason enough for reflection. For instance, if the myth of the trickster were nothing but an historical remnant, one would have to ask why it has not long since vanished into the great rubbish-heap of the past, and why it continues to make its influence felt on the highest levels of civilization, even where, on account of his stupidity and grotesque scurrility, the trickster no longer plays the role of a "delight-maker." His figure seems like an old river-bed in which the water still flows. You can see this best of all from the fact that the trickster motif does not crop up only in its mythical form but appears just as naively and authentically in the unsuspecting modern man -- whenever, in fact, he feels himself at the mercy of annoying "accidents" which thwart his will and his actions with apparently malicious intent.

He then speaks of "hoodoos" and "jinxes" or of the "mischievousness of the object." Here the trickster is represented by counter-tendencies in the unconscious, and in certain cases by a sort of second personality, of a puerile and inferior character, not unlike the personalities who announce themselves at spiritualistic seances and cause all those ineffably childish phenomena so typical of poltergeists. On the civilized level, it is regarded as a personal "gaffe," "slip," "faux pas," etc., which are then chalked up as defects of the conscious personality. We are no longer aware that in carnival customs and the like there are remnants of a collective shadow figure.

Anyone who belongs to a sphere of culture that seeks the perfect state somewhere in the past must feel very weird indeed when confronted by the figure of the trickster. He is a forerunner of the savior, and, like him, God, man, and animal at once. He is both subhuman and superhuman, a bestial and divine being, whose chief and most alarming characteristic is his unconsciousness. Because of it he is deserted by his (evidently human) companions, which seems to indicate that he has fallen below their level of consciousness. He is so unconscious of himself that his body is not a unity, and his two hands fight each other. He takes his anus off and entrusts it with a special task. Even his sex is optional despite its phallic qualities: he can turn himself into a woman and bear children. From his penis he makes all kinds of useful plants. This is a reference to his original nature as a Creator, for the world is made from the body of a god.

On the other hand he is in many respects stupider than the animals, and gets into one ridiculous scrape after another. Although he is not really evil, he does the most atrocious things from sheer unconsciousness and unrelatedness. His imprisonment in animal unconsciousness is suggested by the episode where he gets his head caught inside the skull of an elk, and the next episode shows how he overcomes this condition by imprisoning the head of a hawk inside his own rectum. True, he sinks back into the former condition immediately afterwards, by falling under the ice, and is outwitted time after time by the animals, but in the end he succeeds in tricking the cunning coyote, and this brings back to him his savior nature. The trickster is a primitive "cosmic" being of divine-animal nature, on the one hand superior to man because of his superhuman qualities, and on the other hand inferior to him because of his unreason and unconsciousness. He is no match for animals, either, because of his extraordinary clumsiness and lack of instinct. These defects are the marks of his human nature, which is not so well adapted to the environment as the animal's but, instead, has prospects of a much higher development of consciousness based on a considerable eagerness to learn, as is duly emphasized in the myth.

The so-called civilized man has forgotten the trickster. He remembers him only figuratively and metaphorically, when, irritated by his own ineptitude, he speaks of fate playing tricks on him or of things being bewitched. He never suspects that his own hidden and apparently harmless shadow has qualities whose dangerousness exceeds his wildest dreams. As soon as people get together in masses and submerge the individual, the shadow is mobilized, and, as history shows, may even be personified and incarnated.

Re: Legal Reasoning
« Reply #343 on: August 15, 2008, 12:13:21 PM »

Well, gangsters and cops alike are neither black nor white; they represent the color of gray. A hidden identity between good and evil. The symbiotic relationship of hunter and hunted, embodied by men with guns pointed, arms at full extension, winding around each other in a distinctly homoerotic pas de deux.



After the Sunset


You could have left out the picture..

Re: Legal Sophistry
« Reply #344 on: August 15, 2008, 01:48:37 PM »

Common media for transmitting propaganda messages include news reports, government reports, historical revision, junk science, books, leaflets, movies, radio, television, and posters. In the case of radio and television, propaganda can exist on news, current-affairs or talk-show segments, as advertising or public-service announce "spots" or as long-running advertorials. Propaganda campaigns often follow a strategic transmission pattern to indoctrinate the target group. This may begin with a simple transmission such as a leaflet dropped from a plane or an advertisement. Generally these messages will contain directions on how to obtain more information, via a web site, hot line, radio program, et cetera (as it is seen also for selling purposes among other goals). The strategy intends to initiate the individual from information recipient to information seeker through reinforcement, and then from information seeker to opinion leader through indoctrination.

A number of techniques which are based on social psychological research are used to generate propaganda. Many of these same techniques can be found under logical fallacies, since propagandists use arguments that, while sometimes convincing, are not necessarily valid.

Now, the propaganda model is a theory advanced by Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky that alleges systemic biases in the mass media and seeks to explain them in terms of structural economic causes. "The 20th century has been characterized by three developments of great political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth of corporate power, and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against democracy." First presented in their 1988 book Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media, the propaganda model views the private media as businesses selling a product readers and audiences (rather than news) to other businesses (advertisers).

The first three (ownership, funding, and sourcing) are generally regarded by the authors as being the most important. Although the model was based mainly on the characterization of United States media, Chomsky and Herman believe the theory is equally applicable to any country that shares the basic economic structure and organizing principles which the model postulates as the cause of media biases. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Chomsky stated that the new filter replacing communism would be terrorism and Islam.


I think Chomsky's most important contribution to science has been in linguistics, semantic networks and the like, isn't that so?

Throughout the history of the study of man there has been a fundamental opposition between those who believe that progress is to be made by a rigorous observation of man's actual behavior and those who believe that such observations are interesting only in so far as they reveal to us hidden and possibly fairly mysterious underlying laws that only partially and in distorted form reveal themselves to us in behavior. Freud, for example, is in the latter class, most of American social science in the former. Noam Chomsky is unashamedly with the searchers after hidden laws. Actual speech behavior, speech performance, for him is only the top of a large iceberg of linguistic competence distorted in its shape by many factors irrelevant to linguistics. Indeed he once remarked that the very expression "behavioral sciences" suggests a fundamental confusion between evidence and subject matter. Psychology, for example, he claims is the science of mind; to call psychology a behavioral science is like calling physics a science of meter readings. One uses human behavior as evidence for the laws of the operation of the mind, but to suppose that the laws must be laws of behavior is to suppose that the evidence must be the subject matter.

In this opposition between the methodology of confining research to observable facts and that of using the observable facts as clues to hidden and underlying laws, Chomsky's revolution is doubly interesting: first, within the field of linguistics, it has precipitated a conflict which is an example of the wider conflict; and secondly, Chomsky has used his results about language to try to develop general anti-behaviorist and anti-empiricist conclusions about the nature of the human mind that go beyond the scope of linguistics. His revolution followed fairly closely the general pattern described in Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: the accepted model or "paradigm" of linguistics was confronted, largely by Chomsky's work, with increasing numbers of nagging counterexamples and recalcitrant data which the paradigm could not deal with. Eventually the counter-examples led Chomsky to break the old model altogether and to create a completely new one. Prior to the publication of his Syntactic Structures in 1957, many, probably most, American linguists regarded the aim of their discipline as being the classification of the elements of human languages. Linguistics was to be a sort of verbal botany. As Hockett wrote in 1942, "Linguistics is a classificatory science."

Suppose, for example, that such a linguist is giving a description of a language, whether an exotic language like Cherokee or a familiar one like English. He proceeds by first collecting his "data," he gathers a large number of utterances of the language, which he records on his tape recorder or in a phonetic script. This "corpus" of the language constitutes his subject matter. He then classifies the elements of the corpus at their different linguistic levels: first he classifies the smallest significant functioning units of sound, the phonemes, then at the next level the phonemes unite into the minimally significant bearers of meaning, the morphemes (in English, for example, the word "cat" is a single morpheme made up of three phonemes; the word "uninteresting" is made up of three morphemes: "un," "interest," and "ing"), at the next higher level the morphemes join together to form words and word classes such as noun phrases and verb phrases, and at the highest level of all come sequences of word classes, the possible sentences and sentence types.

The aim of linguistic theory was to provide the linguist with a set of rigorous methods, a set of discovery procedures which he would use to extract from the "corpus" the phonemes, the morphemes, and so on. The study of the meanings of sentences or of the uses to which speakers of the language put the sentences had little place in this enterprise. Meanings, scientifically construed, were thought to be patterns of behavior determined by stimulus and response; they were properly speaking the subject matter of psychologists. Alternatively they might be some mysterious mental entities altogether outside the scope of a sober science or, worse yet, they might involve the speaker's whole knowledge of the world around him and thus fall beyond the scope of a study restricted only to linguistic facts. Structural linguistics, with its insistence on objective methods of verification and precisely specified techniques of discovery, with its refusal to allow any talk of meanings or mental entities or unobservable features, derives from the "behavioral sciences" approach to the study of man, and is also largely a consequence of the philosophical assumptions of logical positivism. Chomsky was brought up in this tradition at the University of Pennsylvania as a student of both Zellig Harris, the linguist, and Nelson Goodman, the philosopher.

Chomsky's work is interesting in large part because, while it is a major attack on the conception of man implicit in the behavioral sciences, the attack is made from within the very tradition of scientific rigor and precision that the behavioral sciences have been aspiring to. His attack on the view that human psychology can be described by correlating stimulus and response is not an a priori conceptual argument, much less is it the cry of an anguished humanist resentful at being treated as a machine or an animal. Rather it is a claim that a really rigorous analysis of language will show that such methods when applied to language produce nothing but false-hoods or trivialities, that their practitioners have simply imitated "the surface features of science" without having its "significant intellectual content." As a graduate student at Pennsylvania, Chomsky attempted to apply the conventional methods of structural linguistics to the study of syntax, but found that the methods that had apparently worked so well with phonemes and morphemes did not work very well with sentences. Each language has a finite number of phonemes and a finite though quite large number of morphemes. It is possible to get a list of each; but the number of sentences in any natural language like French or English is, strictly speaking, infinite. There is no limit to the number of new sentences that can be produced; and for each sentence, no matter how long, it is always possible to produce a longer one. Within structuralist assumptions it is not easy to account for the fact that languages have an infinite number of sentences.

Re: Legal Reasoning
« Reply #345 on: August 15, 2008, 01:54:22 PM »
Furthermore the structuralist methods of classification do not seem able to account for all of the internal relations within sentences, or the relations that different sentences have to each other. For example, to take a famous case, the two sentences "John is easy to please" and "John is eager to please" look as if they had exactly the same grammatical structure. Each is a sequence of noun-copula-adjective-infinitive verb. But in spite of this surface similarity the grammar of the two is quite different. In the first sentence, though it is not apparent from the surface word order, "John" functions as the direct object of the verb to please; the sentence means: it is easy for someone to please John. Whereas in the second "John" functions as the subject of the verb to please; the sentence means: John is eager that he please someone. That this is a difference in the syntax of the sentences comes out clearly in the fact that English allows us to form the noun phrase "John's eagerness to please" out of the second, but not "John's easiness to please" out of the first. There is no easy or natural way to account for these facts within structuralist assumptions. Another set of syntactical facts that structuralist assumptions are inadequate to handle is the existence of certain types of ambiguous sentences where the ambiguity derives not from the words in the sentence but from the syntactical structure. Consider the sentence "The shooting of the hunters is terrible." This can mean that it is terrible that the hunters are being shot or that the hunters are terrible at shooting or that the hunters are being shot in a terrible fashion. Another example is "I like her cooking." In spite of the fact that it contains no ambiguous words (or morphemes) and has a very simple superficial grammatical structure of noun-verb-possessive pronoun-noun, this sentence is in fact remarkably ambiguous. It can mean, among other things, I like what she cooks, I like the way she cooks, I like the fact that she cooks, even, I like the fact that she is being cooked.

Such "syntactically ambiguous" sentences form a crucial test case for any theory of syntax. The examples are ordinary pedestrian English sentences, there is nothing fancy about them. But it is not easy to see how to account for them. The meaning of any sentence is determined by the meanings of the component words (or morphemes) and their syntactical arrangement. How then can we account for these cases where one sentence containing unambiguous words (and morphemes) has several different meanings? Structuralist linguists had little or nothing to say about these cases; they simply ignored them. Chomsky was eventually led to claim that these sentences have several different syntactical structures, that the uniform surface structure of, e.g., "I like her cooking" conceals several different underlying structures which he called "deep" structures. The introduction of the notion of the deep structure of sentences, not always visible in the surface structure, is a crucial element of the Chomsky revolution, and I shall explain it in more detail later. One of the merits of Chomsky's work has been that he has persistently tried to call attention to the puzzling character of facts that are so familiar that we all tend to take them for granted as not requiring explanation. Just as physics begins in wonder at such obvious facts as that apples fall to the ground or genetics in wonder that plants and animals reproduce themselves, so the study of the structure of language beings in wondering at such humdrum facts as that "I like her cooking" has different meanings, "John is eager to please" isn't quite the same in structure as "John is easy to please," and the equally obvious but often overlooked facts that we continually find ourselves saying and hearing things we have never said or heard before and that the number of possible new sentences is infinite.

The inability of structuralist methods to account for such syntactical facts eventually led Chomsky to challenge not only the methods but the goals and indeed the definition of the subject matter of linguistics given by the structuralist linguists. Instead of a taxonomic goal of classifying elements by performing sets of operations on a corpus of utterances, Chomsky argued that the goal of linguistic description should be to construct a theory that would account for the infinite number of sentences of a natural language. Such a theory would show which strings of words were sentences and which were not, and would provide a description of the grammatical structure of each sentence. Such descriptions would have to be able to account for such facts as the internal grammatical relations and the ambiguities described above. The description of a natural language would be a formal deductive theory which would contain a set of grammatical rules that could generate the infinite set of sentences of the language, would not generate anything that was not a sentence, and would provide a description of the grammatical structure of each sentence. Such a theory came to be called a "generative grammar" because of its aim of constructing a device that would generate all and only the sentences of a language.

This conception of the goal of linguistics then altered the conception of the methods and the subject matter. Chomsky argued that since any language contains an infinite number of sentences, any "corpus," even if it contained as many sentences as there are in all the books of the Library of Congress, would still be trivially small. Instead of the appropriate subject matter of linguistics being a randomly or arbitrarily selected set of sentences, the proper object of study was the speaker's underlying knowledge of the language, his "linguistic competence" that enables him to produce and understand sentences he has never heard before. Once the conception of the "corpus" as the subject matter is rejected, then the notion of mechanical procedures for discovering linguistic truths goes as well. Chomsky argues that no science has a mechanical procedure for discovering the truth anyway. Rather, what happens is that the scientist formulates hypotheses and tests them against evidence. Linguistics is no different: the linguist makes conjectures about linguistic facts and tests them against the evidence provided by native speakers of the language. He has in short a procedure for evaluating rival hypotheses, but no procedure for discovering true theories by mechanically processing evidence.

The Chomsky revolution can be summarized in the following chart:



Most of this revolution was already presented in Chomsky's book Syntactic Structures. As one linguist remarked, "The extraordinary and traumatic impact of the publication of Syntactic Structures by Noam Chomsky in 1957 can hardly be appreciated by one who did not live through this upheaval." In the years after 1957 the spread of the revolution was made more rapid and more traumatic by certain special features of the organization of linguistics as a discipline in the United States. Only a few universities had separate departments of linguistics. The discipline was (by contrast to, say, philosophy or psychology), and still is, a rather cozy one. Practitioners were few; they all tended to know one another; they read the same very limited number of journals; they had, and indeed still have, an annual get-together at the Summer Linguistics Institute of the Linguistic Society of America, where issues are thrashed out and family squabbles are aired in public meetings.

All of this facilitated a rapid dissemination of new ideas and a dramatic and visible clash of conflicting views. Chomsky did not convince the established leaders of the field but he did something more important, he convinced their graduate students. And he attracted some fiery disciples, notably Robert Lees and Paul Postal. The spread of Chomsky's revolution, like the spread of analytic philosophy during the same period, was a striking example of the Young Turk phenomenon in American academic life. The graduate students became generative grammarians even in departments that had traditionalist faculties. All of this also engendered a good deal of passion and animosity, much of which still survives. Many of the older generation still cling resentfully to the great traditions, regarding Chomsky and his "epigones" as philistines and vulgarians. Meanwhile Chomsky's views have become the conventional wisdom, and as Chomsky and his disciples of the Sixties very quickly become Old Turks a new generation of Young Turks (many of them among Chomsky's best students) arise and challenge Chomsky's views with a new theory of "generative semantics."

http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/19720629.htm

Post hoc ergo propter hoc
« Reply #346 on: August 15, 2008, 02:15:06 PM »

[...]

Abduction means determining α. It is using the postcondition and the rule to assume that the precondition could explain the postcondition (β ∧ R1 ⇒ α).

[...]

- Abduction allows inferring a as an explanation of b. Because of this, abduction allows the precondition a of "a entails b" to be inferred from the consequence b. Deduction and abduction thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy affirming the consequent.


Post hoc ergo propter hoc, Latin for "after this, therefore because (on account) of this", is a logical fallacy (of the questionable cause variety) which states, "Since that event followed this one, that event must have been caused by this one." It is often shortened to simply post hoc and is also sometimes referred to as false cause, coincidental correlation or correlation not causation. It is subtly different from the fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc, in which the chronological ordering of a correlation is insignificant. Post hoc is a particularly tempting error because temporal sequence appears to be integral to causality. The fallacy lies in coming to a conclusion based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other factors that might rule out the connection. Most familiarly, many superstitious beliefs and magical thinking arise from this fallacy.

Pattern

The form of the post hoc fallacy can be expressed as follows:

A occurred, then B occurred.
Therefore, A caused B.
When B is undesirable, this pattern is often extended in reverse: Avoiding A will prevent B.

Cause & Effect: Logical Reasoning

http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/IJCAI99/ijcai-99.pdf

Re: Legal Reasoning
« Reply #347 on: August 19, 2008, 05:35:21 PM »

[...]

Abduction means determining α. It is using the postcondition and the rule to assume that the precondition could explain the postcondition (β ∧ R1 ⇒ α).

[...]

- Abduction allows inferring a as an explanation of b. Because of this, abduction allows the precondition a of "a entails b" to be inferred from the consequence b. Deduction and abduction thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy affirming the consequent.


Post hoc ergo propter hoc, Latin for "after this, therefore because (on account) of this", is a logical fallacy (of the questionable cause variety) which states, "Since that event followed this one, that event must have been caused by this one." It is often shortened to simply post hoc and is also sometimes referred to as false cause, coincidental correlation or correlation not causation. It is subtly different from the fallacy cum hoc ergo propter hoc, in which the chronological ordering of a correlation is insignificant. Post hoc is a particularly tempting error because temporal sequence appears to be integral to causality. The fallacy lies in coming to a conclusion based solely on the order of events, rather than taking into account other factors that might rule out the connection. Most familiarly, many superstitious beliefs and magical thinking arise from this fallacy.

Pattern

The form of the post hoc fallacy can be expressed as follows:

A occurred, then B occurred.
Therefore, A caused B.
When B is undesirable, this pattern is often extended in reverse: Avoiding A will prevent B.

Cause & Effect: Logical Reasoning

http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/IJCAI99/ijcai-99.pdf


In the natural world, most things occur in loops. That is cause becomes effect and effect becomes cause. It is a logical loop. It doesn't reduce well in the linear logic of most people. This confuses a lot of people. It seems quite logical because of this to understand that whatever process controls earth expansion would be altered by its progress. It is both cause and effect. For those who think A + B = C or other linear logic this is confusing. It doesn't reduce well. It doesn't fit computer programs well either. In the case of EE I expect in time that the reaction rates and end products will be altered by the very planet in which they occur. It is neither linear nor exponental. It is discrete quanta or packages. The reaction would happen one way for a while, and then another for a while and so on because the planet or star it happens on changes the reaction in both the matrix it happens in as well as changing the energy supply for it. The discussion of time is important because time is a pure and simple man made illusionary construct. I don't mean that things don't age but rather the clock is pure man. Many of the limitations imposed here cause us not to see what is happening or has happened because we live short lives etc. When we attempt to look too far back in time, we get a lot of errors in what we believe. In addition we rely too much on needing to know the end reaction (IE Big Bang). The Big Bang for example is taken as gospel yet even if it occurred it had to do so within an existing matrix of conditions. It wasn't the beginning. It was part of an on going process. Yet that is so far removed from our condition and events that it is really of no value to suppose it.

The Big Bang owes itself to a dynamic effort arising in the 1880's and was very much part of a social event set associated with the fracturing of religion and the rise of evolution. It was a necessity for the evolutionists to be able to destroy the possibility of creation so they latched onto a series of theories that rose up into the "big bang" cosmology. The only problem was that this theory stinks as bad as the simplistic belief of ignorant people. It really has no fact behind it. When Hubble came along the "Hubble Constant" became the holy grail of this pseudo religion or anti-religion religion. It isn't real. There is lots of good cosmologic observation that just dumps it in the trash bin. The "big bang" theory is a reaction to religion and not good science in any way. With all of this in mind, lets look at what can be expected regards the acceptance of EE. That is what will happen. Some time in the near future we will see a few literate organizations starting to openly accept small parts of the data. In time some parties will openly come out. After that it will get a place in the great discoveries. This path was what Plate Techtonics followed. It just takes people getting out of their chairs (Literally endowments) and new people coming in. I think this process is well under way. It just takes time. We can never expect a thank you note from the gang who comes in. They may not even allow us in the game. 

Re: Legal Reasoning
« Reply #348 on: August 20, 2008, 04:45:08 AM »
lol, this is a long thread to read. Keep us posted

Re: Not That Sarcastic, After All...
« Reply #349 on: August 20, 2008, 11:16:39 AM »

The history of civilization is largely the account of the attempts of man to forget his transformation from an animal into a human being. So stubborn a refusal to forget is not an accident. Even the most enlightened of us will set up a Christmas tree for his children without having the least idea what this custom means, invariably disposed to nip any attempt at interpretation in the bud. For the thoughtful observer, however, both Christmas tree and trickster afford reason enough for reflection. For instance, if the myth of the trickster were nothing but an historical remnant, one would have to ask why it has not long since vanished into the great rubbish-heap of the past, and why it continues to make its influence felt on the highest levels of civilization, even where, on account of his stupidity and grotesque scurrility, the trickster no longer plays the role of a "delight-maker." His figure seems like an old river-bed in which the water still flows. You can see this best of all from the fact that the trickster motif does not crop up only in its mythical form but appears just as naively and authentically in the unsuspecting modern man -- whenever, in fact, he feels himself at the mercy of annoying "accidents" which thwart his will and his actions with apparently malicious intent.

He then speaks of "hoodoos" and "jinxes" or of the "mischievousness of the object." Here the trickster is represented by counter-tendencies in the unconscious, and in certain cases by a sort of second personality, of a puerile and inferior character, not unlike the personalities who announce themselves at spiritualistic seances and cause all those ineffably childish phenomena so typical of poltergeists. On the civilized level, it is regarded as a personal "gaffe," "slip," "faux pas," etc., which are then chalked up as defects of the conscious personality. We are no longer aware that in carnival customs and the like there are remnants of a collective shadow figure.

Anyone who belongs to a sphere of culture that seeks the perfect state somewhere in the past must feel very weird indeed when confronted by the figure of the trickster. He is a forerunner of the savior, and, like him, God, man, and animal at once. He is both subhuman and superhuman, a bestial and divine being, whose chief and most alarming characteristic is his unconsciousness. Because of it he is deserted by his (evidently human) companions, which seems to indicate that he has fallen below their level of consciousness. He is so unconscious of himself that his body is not a unity, and his two hands fight each other. He takes his anus off and entrusts it with a special task. Even his sex is optional despite its phallic qualities: he can turn himself into a woman and bear children. From his penis he makes all kinds of useful plants. This is a reference to his original nature as a Creator, for the world is made from the body of a god.

On the other hand he is in many respects stupider than the animals, and gets into one ridiculous scrape after another. Although he is not really evil, he does the most atrocious things from sheer unconsciousness and unrelatedness. His imprisonment in animal unconsciousness is suggested by the episode where he gets his head caught inside the skull of an elk, and the next episode shows how he overcomes this condition by imprisoning the head of a hawk inside his own rectum. True, he sinks back into the former condition immediately afterwards, by falling under the ice, and is outwitted time after time by the animals, but in the end he succeeds in tricking the cunning coyote, and this brings back to him his savior nature. The trickster is a primitive "cosmic" being of divine-animal nature, on the one hand superior to man because of his superhuman qualities, and on the other hand inferior to him because of his unreason and unconsciousness. He is no match for animals, either, because of his extraordinary clumsiness and lack of instinct. These defects are the marks of his human nature, which is not so well adapted to the environment as the animal's but, instead, has prospects of a much higher development of consciousness based on a considerable eagerness to learn, as is duly emphasized in the myth.

The so-called civilized man has forgotten the trickster. He remembers him only figuratively and metaphorically, when, irritated by his own ineptitude, he speaks of fate playing tricks on him or of things being bewitched. He never suspects that his own hidden and apparently harmless shadow has qualities whose dangerousness exceeds his wildest dreams. As soon as people get together in masses and submerge the individual, the shadow is mobilized, and, as history shows, may even be personified and incarnated.


Great post, 4F!