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Messages - LawNOrder
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:51:53 PM »
Do you know what happened with Britney? When exactly did Britney Spears jump the shark? Writer Camille Paglia says it was when she kissed Madonna on the 2003 MTV Video Music Awards. Paglia told US that, in a sense, Madonna was saying, "'I'm passing the torch to you.' It was a fabulous moment. Britney looked toned, in control of her career. Literally from that kiss, from that moment onward, Britney has spiraled out of control." Thanks a lot, Madge.
Looks like Madonna has smarter advisors/pr people!
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:49:43 PM »
You can definitely think in these terms .. I mean, in Nazi Germany you had no chance whatsoever to rise in prominence if you're Jew, even if you supported Hitler's views 110% .. Any Jew Nazi Party members, anyone?
Wow, interesting username, pixelaw!
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:47:39 PM »
On a grimmer note, we have learned in recent decades that nation-states no longer enjoy monopolies in their conduct of wars: guerilla tactics, suicide attacks, and insurgencies have turned war, itself, into a decentralized undertaking. What makes so-called "terrorist" groups so difficult to identify and deal with is their decentralized, non-hierarchical form of organization. Recall how 19 men, armed only with box-cutter knives, were able to attack the World Trade Center buildings and precipitate the insanity the United States now wages against innocent people.
"Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy," by John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt examines the new spectrum of conflict emerging in the wake of the information revolution. Netwar includes conflicts waged, on the one hand, by terrorists, criminals, gangs, and ethnic extremists; and by civil-society activists (such as cyber activists or WTO protestors) on the other. What distinguishes netwar is the networked organizational structure of its practitioners -- with many groups actually being leaderless -- and their quickness in coming together in swarming attacks. Completed shortly before terrorists attacked New York and Washington, the volume includes an Afterword analyzing the Attack on America. The events of September 11, 2001, tragically reinforced Arquilla and Ronfeldt's conclusion that in order to confront this new type of conflict, it is crucial for governments, military, and law enforcement to begin networking themselves.
"Just as a half century ago, researchers at RAND sought to understand the profound changes in strategy brought about by nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles," says Brian Michael Jenkins, one of the world's foremost experts on terrorism and crime, "Arquilla and Ronfeldt explore the strategic implications of new information technologies in the latest installment of their seminal work ... Networks and Netwars obliges us to think in new ways." In Networks and Netwars, the editors and their colleagues examine the major instances of netwar that have occurred over the past several years -- from Osama bin Laden's networked terrorists to the Battle of Seattle's social activists -- and find, among other things, that netwars have generally been successful from the protagonists' perspective. The authors also find that, despite their diversity, all networks built for waging netwar may be analyzed in terms of a common analytic framework. There are 5 critical levels of theory and practice: the technological, social, narrative, organizational, and doctrinal levels. A netwar actor must get all 5 right to be fully effective. The most potent netwarriors will not only be highly networked and have the capacity for mounting "swarming" attacks, they will also be held together by strong social ties, have secure communications technologies, and project a common "story" about why they are together and what they need to do. Like Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda, these are the most serious adversaries. But even those networks that are weak on some levels may pose stiff challenges to their nation-state adversaries.
"A particular challenge for the cumbersome American bureaucracy will be to encourage deep, all-channel networking among the military, law enforcement, and intelligence elements whose collaboration is crucial for achieving success," Arquilla and Ronfeldt explain in the Afterword. "U.S. agencies have been headed in this direction for years-in the areas of counter-narcotics as well as counterterrorism -- but interagency rivalries and distrust have too often slowed progress." Writers who focus on the technological aspects of netwar often miss the point. As the editors point out, "At its heart, Netwar is far more about organization and doctrine than it is about technology. The outcomes of current and future netwars are bound to confirm this." Nathan Gardels, editor of New Perspectives Quarterly, and author of The Changing Global Order, says "Arquilla and Ronfeldt are a rare breed: strategic thinkers of the information age. In Networks and Netwars they grasp an emerging reality still lost on those preoccupied with the geostrategic balance of power: War in the future will be waged by leaderless networks that can come together quickly out of cyberspace to 'swarm' an opponent. Like few others, they recognize that the flipside of the celebrated global civil society born of the Internet is the 'uncivil society' of terrorists and criminals who will use the same means to spread havoc and instability."
"Rushing into an increasingly complex world, we need ways to probe the road ahead, to find the quicksand and pitfalls before falling in," says David Brin, author of "The Postman, Earth, and The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?" "Arquilla and Ronfeldt have taken on this hard task, searching for technological threats to a society that has grown reliant on data-based infrastructure ... In this collection of cogent articles, by experts in the field of netwar, they clarify some of the dangers that await us-and reveal possible ways to avoid them. It's obviously an important and seminal work. I especially like their analysis of the key features that enable groups to be effective in this new arena of conflict."
Quite interesting, assuming they're being truthful!
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:37:01 PM »
afewpegs, I think there's another thread on this board that your post more appropriately (sorry for the language used) belongs to -- I think it called "Psychopath attorneys" or something like it ..
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:34:06 PM »
Next time you make a printout from your color laser printer, shine an LED flashlight beam on it and examine it closely with a magnifying glass. You might be able to see the small, scattered yellow dots printed there that could be used to trace the document back to you. According to experts, several printer companies quietly encode the serial number and the manufacturing code of their color laser printers and color copiers on every document those machines produce. Governments, including the United States, already use the hidden markings to track counterfeiters.
Peter Crean, a senior research fellow at Xerox, says his company's laser printers, copiers and multifunction workstations, such as its WorkCentre Pro series, put the "serial number of each machine coded in little yellow dots" in every printout. The millimeter-sized dots appear about every inch on a page, nestled within the printed words and margins. "It's a trail back to you, like a license plate," Crean says. The dots' minuscule size, covering less than one-thousandth of the page, along with their color combination of yellow on white, makes them invisible to the naked eye, Crean says. One way to determine if your color laser is applying this tracking process is to shine a blue LED light--say, from a keychain laser flashlight -- on your page and use a magnifier.
Crime Fighting vs. Privacy
Laser-printing technology makes it incredibly easy to counterfeit money and documents, and Crean says the dots, in use in some printers for decades, allow law enforcement to identify and track down counterfeiters. However, they could also be employed to track a document back to any person or business that printed it. Although the technology has existed for a long time, printer companies have not been required to notify customers of the feature. Lorelei Pagano, a counterfeiting specialist with the U.S. Secret Service, stresses that the government uses the embedded serial numbers only when alerted to a forgery. "The only time any information is gained from these documents is purely in [the case of] a criminal act," she says. John Morris, a lawyer for The Center for Democracy and Technology , says, "That type of assurance doesn't really assure me at all, unless there's some type of statute." He adds, "At a bare minimum, there needs to be a notice to consumers."
If the practice disturbs you, don't bother trying to disable the encoding mechanism -- you'll probably just break your printer. Crean describes the device as a chip located "way in the machine, right near the laser" that embeds the dots when the document "is about 20 billionths of a second" from printing. "Standard mischief won't get you around it," Crean adds. Neither Crean nor Pagano has an estimate of how many laser printers, copiers, and multifunction devices track documents, but they say that the practice is commonplace among major printer companies.
"The industry absolutely has been extraordinarily helpful [to law enforcement]," Pagano says. According to Pagano, counterfeiting cases are brought to the Secret Service, which checks the documents, determines the brand and serial number of the printer, and contacts the company. Some, like Xerox, have a customer database, and they share the information with the government. Crean says Xerox and the government have a good relationship. "The U.S. government had been on board all along -- they would actually come out to our labs," Crean says.
Unlike ink jet printers, laser printers, fax machines, and copiers fire a laser through a mirror and series of lenses to embed the document or image on a page. Such devices range from a little over $100 to more than $1000, and are designed for both home and office. Crean says Xerox pioneered this technology about 20 years ago, to assuage fears that their color copiers could easily be used to counterfeit bills. "We developed the first (encoding mechanism) in house because several countries had expressed concern about allowing us to sell the printers in their country," Crean says. Since then, he says, many other companies have adopted the practice. The United States is not the only country teaming with private industry to fight counterfeiters. A recent article points to the Dutch government as using similar anticounterfeiting methods, and cites Canon as a company with encoding technology. Canon USA declined to comment.
« on: December 29, 2006, 11:27:09 PM »
Incidentally, did you know that one only needs a 162 on the LSAT to qualify for MENSA?
« on: October 26, 2004, 09:14:50 PM »
Here is my dilemma. I took the LSAT twice. First time I was an idiot (wasn't completly prepared and working 60 hour weeks in consulting) and I scored a 163. Just recently on the Oct 2004 LSAT I was prepared, but had problems with the testing center (the proctors messed up on time), and it affected me but I didn't realize to the tune of a 158 . I was scoring in the low 170's and high 160's before the this past test (LSAC said they will send out a letter with my score, but does anyone know how much a difference this will make?).
I signed up for the December LSAT, so I am wondering how incredibly screwed am I? Should I apply now indicating I am taking it in december and risk an auto-ding? Or wait to apply to schools that take the highest LSAT score until December...I am targeting UTexas Law (resident, 3.8 gpa, and masters in accounting from UT) but I am not sure if I have a chance anymore. Any words of advice?
« on: July 08, 2004, 11:13:26 PM »
Yeah the numbers range the gambit, but whatcha going to do? This has been a tough year to apply to law school. I am not sure how next year is going to look (if any better or worse).
To Enzyme, your numbers are great. Just one thing to keep in mind. It seems as though law school admissions don't care about graduate degrees or gpa's. I thought mine would give me a boost, but no such luck. I think they just pretty much look at undergrad gpa's (which in your case, you are still golden). Best of luck to ya!
« on: July 08, 2004, 08:01:15 PM »
Yeah Texas resident, non-urm. Majored in accounting at a top 10 undergrad B-school.
« on: July 08, 2004, 12:53:07 PM »
I got a 163 on the LSAT and I have a 3.72 gpa.
I have a masters in accounting and a couple of years work experience.
I am debtating retaking the LSAT if I don't get in this year...Hopefully there will be a miracle and I can start this year. I am not sure if that is going to happen though...