Law School Discussion

I'm sure jumboshrimps will probably weigh in on this question. All the better!

(1) I wanted to know how conduct is considered communicative and how sufficiently communicative must it be to be covered by the First Amendment. (Let's say a statute prohibits face-painting in public except for football games and a group of mentally retarded people who face-painted themselves in public are challenging this statute. Crazy hypo, I know, but bear with me)

(2) Assuming the conduct is deemed either non-communicative or communicative, how are time, place, or manner restrictions evaluated to determine the restriction/regulation/statute's constitutionality? (Say the group challenges the statute's facial validity by pointing to the statutes' exception for football games)

(3) This one seems to be the tricky part to me:
Assume a court has found this form of conduct (putting on face paint in public) by mentally disabled persons to be insufficiently communicative to come under the First Amendment. Say the statute in question banned all face paint in public except for football games/mardi gras/some other holiday. Can this finding (noncommunicative) be the basis of arguing that a time, place, or manner statute banning the conduct of putting on face paint is not unconstitutional even though people at football games can put on face paint?

(3)(a) What if another group, say, natives of Eporue, challenged the statute, and they argued that face-painting is their only form of identification? Will this challenge stand if the court has already found in (3) that the statute is not facially unconstitutional?

A big thanks to everyone who took the time to read through all this unintelligible crap!

Well yeah, the issues aren't identical, but in determining whether or not to compel the officer to do something, the trial court had to decide whether the hearing officer's findings were consistent with the evidence. In reviewing the evidence and exercising its independent judgment, the court could find either the guy was or wasn't wrongfully terminated.

So say the TC finds that the guy was not wrongfully terminated and denies the writ. The findings of fact/law in this ruling cannot be a basis for collaterally estopping the new suit?

BTW: thanks for your replies, it's helping me think this through, keep'em coming if possible.

I have a civ pro question that seems so basic but is giving me a hard time.

Here are the facts:

Round 1

(1) Man gets fired, files a grievance for wrongful termination, grievance is denied in a quasi-judicial proceeding with hearings, presentation of evidence, witnesses, etc etc
(2) Man petitions for writ of mandate in trial court, which is denied.
(3) Man appeals denial, appellate court affirms

If one wanted to collaterally estop man from relitigating an issue previously decided in Round 1, would one look to the findings in the quasi-judicial grievance proceeding, the trial court order, the appellate court decision, or some combination of all three?

Thanks!